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China's Comparative Constitution
Bui Ngoc Son*
ABSTRACT

The academic field of comparative constitutional law has
recently had greater engagements with China's constitution. This

Article explains the modes, conditions, and factors of these
engagements. The country-studies of China's constitution echo
and complicate recent comparative debates on transnational
constitution making and the varieties of constitutionalism.

Comparative constitutional scholarship formulates new concepts,
such as constitutional entrepreneurship and constitutional
dissonance, to understand China's constitution. Additionally, it
explains China's constitutional divergence from the most similar

case, namely Vietnam, and its unexpected constitutional
similarities with the most different cases, such as the United
States

and the United Kingdom.

Finally,

this scholarship

discusses China's constitution as a difficult case of constitutional
authoritarianism, a prototypical case of authoritarian
constitutionalism,

- an

outlier

case

party-state

of

constitutionalism, and an illustrating case of global
constitutional trends, such as the statist constitutional model and
presidential term-limit evasion. The comparative engagements
with China's constitution are due to the increasing sociopolitical

significance

of the

country's constitutional

text

and the

institutional trend of its living constitutional order, as well as the
recent jurisdictional, substantive, and epistemological expansion
of comparative constitutional law. The comparative engagements

* Assistant Professor, The Chinese University of Hong Kong Faculty of Law. I am also
grateful for the CUHK LAW's CCTL Comparative Constitutional Law Research Forum
seminar- Constitutional Law in Greater China: Comparative Issues where this Article
was presented. I am also grateful for the excellent editorial work of the Vanderbilt
Journal of Transnational Law.
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are principally animated by scholars' intellectual curiosity to
explore the unknown regardingChina's constitutionaldynamics
and partially by the need of its constitutional development and
particularoutlooks on constitutionaljustice.
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INTRODUCTION

In his seminal book Comparative Matters, published in 2014, Ran
Hirschl lamented that mainstream comparative constitutional law has
focused on "a handful of 'usual suspect' settings that are mainly of the
western, liberal-democratic breed."' China has been marginalized in
the field for this reason. Wen-Chen Chang and David Law observe that:
"Perusal of the English-language comparative constitutional law
literature leaves the vague impression that there has been as much
written on Singapore-an independent city-state with roughly the

RAN HIRScHL, COMPARATIVE MATTERS: THE RENAISSANcE OF COMPARATIVE
1.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 211 (2014).
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population of greater Miami-as on China, home to one-fifth of the
world's population and a growing economy to match." 2

Recent

years,

however,

have

witnessed

comparative

constitutional law's greater engagements with China. Chinese
constitutional experience has been discussed by leading constitutional
3
comparatists, published in major law reviews and journals, and
included in important collections. 4
In addition to comparative literature, a growing body of English
language country studies provides detailed treatments on China's
constitutional issues. 5 These national accounts have comparative
implications.
This Article seeks to explain how and why comparative

constitutional law scholarship has had greater engagement with
China's constitution than the previous periods. It also discusses the
comparative implications of the national accounts of China's
constitution. This Article focuses on the relevant English language
6
scholarship in the last five years. It adopts a functional definition of

"constitution" to denote "a larger set of constitutional elements,"
including the written text, theories,
interpretations. 7 In this sense, the term
C refers to China's constitutional text,
with the small-c refers to China's larger

2.

traditions, aspirations, and
"Constitution" with the largewhile the term "constitution"
constitutional order.

Wen-Chen Chang & David Law, Constitutional Dissonance in China, in

COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY 476, 477 (Gary Jacobsohn & Miguel Schor eds.,
2018).

&

See, e.g., Mila Versteeg, Timothy Horley, Anne Meng, Maurcio Guim
3.
Marilyn Guirguis, The Law and Politics of PresidentialTerm Limit Evasion, 120 COLUM.
L. REV. 173 (2020) (discussing term limit deletion through 2018 constitutional
amendments in China); Note, Dr. Wu's Constitution, 132 HARV. L. REV. 2300 (2019); Yan
Lin & Tom Ginsburg, Constitutional Interpretation in Lawmaking: China's Invisible
Constitutional Enforcement Mechanism, 63 AM. J. COMP. L. 467 (2015); Yan
Lin, ConstitutionalEvolution Through Legislation: The Quiet Transformationof China's
Constitution, 13 INT'L J. CONST. L. 61 (2015).
See generally Chang & Law, supra note 2 (this collection includes a single
4.
chapter on China); Qianfan Zhang, The Constitution of China, in THE CAMBRIDGE
COMPANION TO COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 171 (Roger Masterman & Robert

Schntze eds., 2019) (including the China chapter, along with other country-chapters on
the US, UK, France, and India that are included in the part on constitutional history);
Albert H.Y. Chen, Constitutions and Values in Three Chinese Societies, in AN INQUIRY
INTO THE EXISTENCE

OF GLOBAL VALUES THROUGH THE LENS OF COMPARATIVE

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 119 (Dennis Davis, Alan Richter & Cheryl Saunders eds., 2015).
See Part II.A.
5.
For earlier engagements, see generally Randall Peerenboom, Social
6.
Foundations of China's Living Constitution, in COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL DESIGN

138 (Tom Ginsburg ed., 2012); Xin He, The Party's Leadership as a Living Constitution
in China, in CONSTITUTIONS IN AUTHORITARIAN REGIMES 245 (Tom Ginsburg & Alberto

Simpser eds., 2013).
ZACHARY ELKINS, TOM GINSBURG & JAMES MELTON, THE ENDURANCE OF
7.
NATIONAL CONSTITUTIONS 36, 39 (2009); WALTER MURPHY, CONSTITUTIONAL
DEMOCRACY: CREATING AND MAINTAINING A JUST POLITICAL ORDER 13 (2007).
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This study is drawn on Hirschl's formulation of modes and factors
of comparative constitutional inquiry. The modes include singlecountry studies, concept formation, inference-oriented small-N studies
(with the most similar, most different, most difficult, prototypical, and
outlier cases principles), and large-N studies.8 According to Hirschl,
comparative constitutional engagement is driven by three analytically
distinct but possibly intersecting factors, namely: necessity or the need
for political and legal development; inquisitiveness or intellectual
curiosity and quest to explore and explain the unknown; and politics or
comparative

engagement

as the instrument

to promote

certain

political agenda, worldview, ideology, or conceptions of good society. 9
In addition to modes and factors, this study contends that it is
important to explore the conditions for comparative engagements with
China's constitution. These conditions involve the changing context of
China's constitution and the changing state of comparative
constitutional law.

On that epistemological and methodological base, this Article
argues that the comparative engagements with China's constitution
are due to the increasing sociopolitical significance of the country's
constitutional text and the institutional trend of its living
constitutional order, and the recent jurisdictional, substantive, and
epistemological expansion of comparative constitutional law. The
comparative
engagements
constitutional intellectuals'

are principally
animated by the
curiosity to explore the unknown

regarding China's constitutional dynamics. But the engagements are
also partially driven by the need of China's constitutional development
and particular outlooks on constitutional justice.
The remainder of this Article is structured as follows: Part II
explores national and comparative accounts of China's constitution,
Part III explains the conditions and factors of comparative
constitutional law's engagement with China's constitution, and Part IV
concludes.

8.
9.

HIRSCHL, supranote 1, at 244.
Id. at 148-49.
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CHINA'S CONSTITUTION COMPARED

This Part reviews some recent national accounts of China's
constitution and discusses their comparative implications. It then
explores, in a critical way, various modes of comparative inquiry into

China's constitution.
A.

Country-Studies

1. Overview
A rich body of English language country studies canvasses a range
of Chinese constitutional issues. Numerous papers on Chinese
constitutional law have appeared in national, regional, and

comparative outlets, such as the Chinese Journalof Comparative Law,
the Hong Kong Law Journal, and the Tsinghua China Law Review,
among others. Several nonlegal periodicals focusing on China, such as
the Modern China, The China Journal, and the China Review, have
also published scholarship on Chinese constitutional issues and their
relations to the broader social and political milieu. Last but not least,

Chinese constitutional issues have been discussed in recent collections
0
generally or on constitutional
dealing with Chinese law reform'
development" particularly.
Such country studies provide readers a deep understanding of
China's constitutional system, different aspects of its constitutional
history.' 2 Such inquiries also explore China's contemporary, specific
constitutional institutions, practices, dynamics, such as the 2013
4
constitutionalism debate,1 3 the 2018 constitutional amendments,'
5
judicialization of the constitution,' 6
constitutional legitimacy,'

See generally CHINESE LEGAL REFORM AND THE GLOBAL LEGAL ORDER:
10.
ADOPTION AND ADAPTATION (Yun Zhao & Michael Ng eds., 2017); CHINA'S SOcIALIST
RULE OF LAW REFORMS UNDER XI JINPING (John Garrick & Yan Chang Bennett eds.,
2016).
See CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT IN CHINA, 1982-2012 (Lin Li, Jihong
11.

Mo & Guoqiang Zhai eds., 2020).
See Cheng Jie, Why Late Qing ConstitutionalReform Failed:An Examination
12.
from the Comparative InstitutionalPerspective, 10 TSINGHUA CHINA L. REV. 107 (2017).
13.

See generally Rogier Creemers, China's ConstitutionalismDebate: Content,

Context and Implications, 74 CHINA J. 91 (2015); H. Li, Chinese Discourse on
Constitutionalismand Its Impact on Reforms, 22 J. CHINESE POL. ScI. 407 (2017).
See generally Feng Lin, The 2018 ConstitutionalAmendments, 2019 CHINA
14.
PERSP. 11.

See generally Xie Libin & Haig Patapan, Contesting Legitimacy in China: The
15.
Politics of Law in Modern Chinese Jurisprudence, 46 H.K. L.J. 991 (2016).
See generally Daniel Sprick, Judicialization of the Chinese Constitution
16.
Revisited: Empirical Evidence from Court Data, 19 CHINA REV. 41 (2019).
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constitutional enforcement, 1 7 and constitutional education. 18 These
country studies contain some comparative elements and resonate with
recent debate in comparative constitutional law. From a functional
perspective, it can be said that that the constitutional problems (e.g.,
design, constitutionalism, and identity) confronting China may be the
common constitutional problems. To illustrate, consider the three
books below.
2. Constitution Making, Constitutionalism, and Identity
The book Chinese Legal Culture and Constitutional Order, written
by Chinese-American political scientist Shiping Hua, provides a
comprehensive treatment of constitution making in China.1 9 It divides
China's constitution making and reform into six periods: late Qing
(e.g., the Imperial Constitutional Outline); Republican (e.g., the 1946
constitution of the Republic of China or ROC); early People's Republic
of China or PRC (e.g., 1954 Constitution); Maoist (e.g., 1975
Constitution); the Dengist (e.g., the current 1982 Constitution); and
the four constitutional amendments in 1988, 1993, 1999, and 2004.20

Hua argues that constitutional reforms in China are shaped by
Chinese legal culture's four common elements, namely, pragmatism,
statism, instrumentalism, and favoritism. He contends that legal and
constitutional reforms were based on political elites' practical
consideration and used as the tool to strengthen the state and to grant
or withdraw rights to citizens depending on circumstances.21 The book
offers useful contextual knowledge on the cultural, social, political, and
economic conditions of Chinese constitutional change. Although it is
primarily a country study, it includes some horizontal comparisons

(with Meiji, US, and Soviet constitutions) and vertical comparisons
(e.g., the 1982 and 1954 constitutions). 22
Another important book, Chinese Constitutionalism in a Global
Context by Peng Chengyi, a Chinese political science scholar in Beijing,
is a comprehensive exploration of Chinese contemporary debate on
constitutionalism. 2 3 The debate has a long history in China but
reached wider popular platforms (newspapers and the internet) in

See generally ZHAI LIN & GUOQIANG ZHAI, REPORT ON CONSTITUTIONAL
17.
ENFORcEMENT AND CONSTITUTIONAL REVIEW IN CHINA (2018).

See generally Liu Han, Towards Constitutional Re-Enlightenment: Teaching
18.
American Constitutional Law in China, 9 TSINGHUA CHINA L. REV. 63 (2016).
19.
See generally SHIPING HUA, CHINESE LEGAL CULTURE AND CONSTITUTIONAL
ORDER (2019).
20.
Id. at 5.
21.
Id. at 2.
22.
Id. at 5.
23.

See generally PENG CHENGYI, CHINESE CONSTITUTIONALISM IN A GLOBAL

CONTEXT (2018).
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2013, triggered by President Xi Jinping's statement on the
24
Chengyi identifies three
implementation of the Constitution.

approaches in Chinese constitutionalism debate: Western liberal,
Confucian, and Marxist. He documents two waves in the spread of
Western liberal constitutionalism in China: the first wave during late
Qing and early republic periods and the second or contemporary wave
25
Driven by the concern of political
starting from the reform era.

freedom, advocates of Western liberal constitutionalism called for free
elections, institutional checks and balances, the rule of law, human
26
rights protection, and constitutional supremacy.
The liberal constitutional discourse generated a traditionalist

reaction-the

Confucian

approach.

The advocates

of Confucian

constitutionalism believe that the liberal constitutional proposals "all
27
Consequently, some descriptive accounts
lack native features."
explored constitutional ideas and institutions (e.g., institutional checks
on royal power through remonstrance and censorship, li, or propriety
as a system of fundamental rules and norms) in Chinese Confucian
tradition, while other normative accounts proposed a model of
28
constitutionalism for future China, rooted in Confucian philosophy.
Particularly, Jiang Qing submitted a normative model of Confucian
constitutional order characterized by, among others, a bicameral

legislature

(Confucian,

national,

and common

houses)

as

the

institutional embodiment of triple sources of constitutional legitimacy
(Heaven, national culture, and the people). 29 Like the liberal approach,
the Confucian approach implicitly or explicitly denies the legitimacy of
the existing socialist constitutional system in China.
Another critical reaction to the liberal model is the so-called
30
China's legal reforms and
"Sinicized Marxist Constitutionalism."
socioeconomic development in the last three decades have generated
the nationalist sources for the intellectual normative accounts of the
Chinese socialist way of constitutionalism, rather than copying the
Western liberal model. 31 The nationalist discourse on the socialist or
Marxist model, however, is diverse. Some Chinese scholars underlined

Id. at 1-2.
24.
Id. at 21-28.
25.
See id. at 29-31.
26.
Id. at 68.
27.
See id. at 45-54.
28.
See id. at 50-51. For Jiang Qing's book, see generally JIANG QING,
29.
A CONFUcIAN CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER: How CHINA'S ANCIENT PAST CAN SHAPE ITS
POLITICAL FUTURE (Daniel Bell & Ruiping Fan eds., Edmund Ryden trans., 2012),
reviewed in Maria Adele Carrai, Confucianism Reconstructed: The Violence of History
and the Making of Constitutionalismin EastAsia, 16 INT'L J. CONST. L. 664, 666 (2018).
For earlier discussions on his theory, see generally THE RENAISSANcE OF CONFUCIANISM
IN CONTEMPORARY CHINA (Ruiping Fan ed., 2011).
See CHENGYI, supra note 23, at 69.
30.

31.

See id. at 66.
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the idea of the Communist Party of China under the rule of law. Other
Chinese intellectuals stressed the party-state structure with the
orthodox

ideology,

while political

authority and pro-government

scholars advocated for the triple combination of the party's leadership,
people's sovereignty, and the rule of law.32
Chengyi notes that, by 2017, Chinese constitutionalism debate "is
still going on with neither side convincing the other side, which is a

well reflection of the ideological nature of the debate." 33 While his book
focuses on national debates on constitutionalism, it includes some
elements of comparison. The book compares different approaches to
constitutionalism in Chinese discourse. In addition, it also compares

the Chinese discourse with other East Asian discourses, such as the
Korean debates on Confucian constitutionalism. 34
Another important book, The Constitutional Identity of
Contemporary China by Han Zhai, a lecturer at Wuhan University,
argues that a unitary system defines today's Chinese constitutional
identity or aspirational and viable fundamental constitutional
features.3 5 This unitary system is characterized by three elements:
regional autonomy (e.g., Hong Kong) within the "one-country, two

systems" arrangement, the pragmatic legislative and fiscal
decentralization within a unitary state, and the separation of the state
and the Communist Party within the one party system. 36 Although this

book focuses more on the "contextual analysis" of Chinese
constitutional arrangements, 37 it also discusses European and
American debates on constitutional identity and comparative
experience of autonomous subnational units (e.g., United Kingdom,
Netherlands, and Spain).
3. Comparative Implications
Hua's book resonates with recent debate on comparative
constitution making and constitutional amendments. To illustrate, the
book's discussion of Western and Japanese influences on late Qing's
constitutional reforms, American influence on the 1946 ROC
constitution, and the Soviet influence on the PRC 1954

China, in CONSTITUTIONALISM BEYOND LIBERALISM 179-86 (Michael W. Dowdle

&

32.
See id. at 84. For socialist constitutionalism, see also Fu Hualing & Zhai
Xiaobo, What Makes the Chinese Constitution Socialist?, 16 INT'L J. CoNsT. L. 655, 655
(2018);
Baogang
He,
Socialist
Constitutionalism
in
Contemporary
Michael A. Wilkinson eds., 2017).
CHENGYI, supra note 23, at 2.
33.
34.
See id. at 46-49.
35.

See generally HAN ZHAI, THE CONSTITUTIONAL IDENTITY OF CONTEMPORARY

CHINA (2020).
36.
See id. at 226-32.
See id. at 19.
37.
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Constitution echoes the global debate on the transnational and
38
international influences on constitution making. The debate on the
involvement of various sectors of the global community in domestic
constitution making and the diffusion of constitutional ideas tends to

focus on recent practices in the globalizing era. But the Chinese story
indicates that transnational constitution making and diffusion may

have a rich history, and hence comparative study of transnational
constitutional history is an important enterprise which deserves
further attention.
In addition, the main argument in Hua's book resonates with the
Xenophon Contiades and Alkmene Fotiadou's pragmatic model of
amendments defined by smooth, efficient, and incremental formal
change to the constitutions within an entrenched clause guaranteed by

courts.39 The Chinese experience, however, suggests that pragmatic
constitutional amendments may not be limited to the institutional

settings with judicial protection of unamendable contents of the
constitutions. Incremental constitutional change is possible within the
constitutional ambit constructed by political elites and social and
40
political conditions.

Chengyi's book echoes and complicates the global debate in
comparative constitutionalism. Mark Tushnet has recently called for
"pluralizing the category of constitutionalism"" and identified the
varieties of constitutionalism, including the liberal, social-democratic,
42
authoritarian, and Islamic varieties. At a global level, the emergence
43
has animated the
of various non-liberal forms of constitutionalism
pluralist discourse on constitutionalism. The Chinese debates present
the local embodiment of the pluralist discourse on the varieties of
constitutionalism. Particularly, the nationalist, critical response on
liberal constitutionalism in Chinese discourse resonates with "the

38.

See generally CONSTITUTION-MAKING AND TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER

(Gregory Shaffer, Tom Ginsburg, & Terence C. Halliday eds., 2019); Cheryl Saunders,
International Involvement in Constitution Making, in COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTION-

MAKING (David Landau & Hanna Lerner eds., 2019); Hanna Lerner & Amir Lupovici,
Constitution-Making and International Relations Theories, 20 INT'L STUD. PERSP. 412

(2019).
39.

Xenophon Contiades & Alkmene Fotiadou, Models of ConstitutionalChange,

in ENGINEERING CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE: A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE ON EUROPE,

CANADA AND THE USA 417, 445-46 (Xenophon Contiades ed., 2013).
For various forms of unamendability, see RICHARD ALBERT, CONSTITUTIONAL
40.
AMENDMENTs: MAKING, BREAKING, AND CHANGING CONSTITUTIONS 140 (2019).
41.
Mark Tushnet, AuthoritarianConstitutionalism, 100 CORNELL L. REV. 391,

413 (2015) [hereinafter Tushnet, AuthoritarianConstitutionalism].
42.
Mark
Tushnet,
Editorial,
Varieties
of
Constitutionalism,
14 INT'L J. CONST. L. 1, 2-4 (2016) [hereinafter Tushnet, Varieties of Constitutionalism].
See Timea Drin6czi & Agnieszka Bien-Kacala, Illiberal Constitutionalism:
43.
The Case of Hungary and Poland, 20 GERMAN L.J. 1140, 1148-51 (2019); Li-ann Thio,
Soft

Constitutional Law

in

INT'L J. CONST. L. 766, 776 (2010).

Nonliberal

Asian

Constitutional Democracies, 8
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coming demise of liberal constitutionalism," which is also rooted in
of
liberal
crisis
The
arguable
sentiments.4 4
nationalist
constitutionalism in the global scale may render it less attractive in
local intellectual discourse, in turn, potentially serving as the empirical
base for local political, nationalist justifications of alternative
constitutional forms.
Together with Islamic and Buddhist varieties, 45 the Chinese and
East Asian discourse on the Confucian variety may complement the
comparative inquiry into the traditional and transcendent dimensions
of constitutionalism. 46 There are three possible lines of positivist
inquiry: theory, design, and adjudication.
The first of these lines-the theoretical exploration of
constitutional ideas in Confucian philosophy-may add to comparative
constitutional theory. To illustrate, in a recent book, Sungmoon Kim
explores two competing theories by two classical Confucians. The first
theory-Mencius's "virtue constitutionalism"-features the idea of
political virtue as the base for legitimate power and rests on the belief
in the good nature of human beings. The second-Xunzi's "ritual
constitutionalism"- underlines the observation of ritual institutions
as the source of legitimate power and stems from the conviction on the
evil nature of human beings. 47 Comparatively, the concerns of virtue
ethics and propriety are not unique to Confucian constitutional theory.
Richard H. Fallon, Jr. discusses constitutional legitimacy as "a
function of moral justifiability or respect-worthiness" and argues that
"[e]ven if a regime or decision enjoys broad support, or if a decision is
legally correct, it may be illegitimate under a moral concept if morally
unjustified."48

Similarly, Ronald Dworkin "brings political morality

into the heart of constitutional law."49 Political morality seems to be
the shared concern of various constitutional theories. To be sure, the
substantive contents of political morality are different in different
constitutional theories, and one function of comparative constitutional
theory is to explore these substantive variations, which include human

See Aziz Huq, Tom Ginsburg & Mila Versteeg, The Coming Demise of Liberal
44.
Constitutionalism?, 85 U. CHI. L. REV. 239, 245 (2018).
45.
See Benjamin Schonthal, Formations of Buddhist Constitutionalism in South
and Southeast Asia, 15 INT'L J. CONST. L. 705, 706-07 (2017).
46.
For early account, see generally CARL FRIEDRICH, TRANSCENDENT JUSTICE:
THE RELIGIOUS DIMENSION OF CONSTITUTIONALISM (1964). For recent accounts, see
generally RAN HIRSCHL, CONSTITUTIONAL THEOCRACY (2010); Yvonne Tew, Stealth

Theocracy, 58 VA. J. INT'L L. 31 (2018).
47.
Sungmoon Kim, Virtue, Ritual, and Constitutionalism, in THEORIZING
CONFUCIAN VIRTUE POLITICS: THE POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY OF MENCIUS AND XUNZI 59, 62
(2019).
48.
Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Legitimacy and the Constitution, 118 HARv. L. REV.
1787, 1796 (2005).
49.

Ronald Dworkin, FREEDOM'S LAW: THE MORAL READING OF THE AMERICAN

CONSTITUTION 2 (1999).
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dignity associated with individual rights or governmental duty to serve
the common good.
Second, the Confucian traditional values (particularly "filial piety,
respect for elders, ancestor worship, ritual propriety, and social
harmony" 50 ) inform contemporary constitutional design. In China, this
is particularly implied in the incorporation of the idea of "harmony"the core of Confucian morality-in China's constitutional preamble
through the 2018 amendment.5 1 In South Korea, the Constitution

stipulates the state's duty "to sustain and develop the cultural heritage
52
this implies that the state's
and to enhance national culture";
5
reservation of Confucian culture is a major part of Korean culture. 3
This has implications for positivist comparative inquiry into
constitutional design in pluralist societies. Comparative constitutional
design is not merely about rules and institutions but is also concerned
with the way various sources of ideas and values are expressed in
constitution making. In societies with Confucian traditions, the

constitutions may express the Confucian values:
Third, Confucian values do not merely implicate constitutional
design: they also inform the manner, style, and even substantive
contents of constitutional adjudication. To illustrate, as Ginsburg early
demonstrated, the remonstrant manner in the operation of
constitutional courts in Korea and Taiwan was connected to the
Confucian tradition. 54 In a case in 2011 involving a daughter suing her

mother

for

abuse

that

lasted

over forty

years,

the Korean

Constitutional Court even explicitly referred to the Confucian values
in the substantive contents of its decision to uphold the Criminal
Procedure Act's provision prohibiting criminal accusation against one's
lineal ascendants. 5 5 The dominant opinion wrote:
The current provision is based on our historical ideology of "hyo," or the
Confucian tradition of filial piety, which imposed on children a duty to take care
of the parents or grandparents. According to this tradition, it is a good custom
for a child to endure harm caused by his or her parents or grandparents; filing a
criminal complaint against one's parents or grandparents is regarded as a
behavior against morality.

5 6

Sungmoon Kim, Public Reason Confucianism:A Construction, 109 AM. POL.
50.
ScI. REV. 187, 191 (2015).
XIANFA pmbl. (2018) (China).
51.
52.

DAEHANMINKUK HUNBEOB [HUNBEOB] [CONSTITUTION] art. 9 (S. Kor.).

Kim, supranote 50, at 192.
53.
Confucian Constitutionalism? The Emergence of
Tom Ginsburg,
54.
ConstitutionalReview in Korea and Taiwan, 27 L. & Soc. INQUIRY 763, 766 (2002).
See Marie Seong-Hak Kim, Confucianism that Confounds: Constitutional
55.
Jurisprudence on Filial Piety in Korea, in CONFUcIANISM, LAw, AND DEMOCRAcY IN
CONTEMPORARY KOREA 57, 61-62 (Sungmoon Kim ed., 2015).

56.

Id. at 63.
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Thus, the Confucian value of filial piety explicitly informs the
substantive contents of constitutional adjudication. More recently,
focusing on the Korean Constitutional Court's 2017 decision to uphold
President Park Geun-hye's impeachment, Kim Sungmoon explains the
association of the Confucian ideas with the Court's jurisprudence was
"characterized by highly moralistic language and style of reasoning."5 7
Confucian values coexist with alternative constitutional values, and
this disharmony animates constitutional dynamics in East Asia, as
Gary J. Jacobsohn early anticipated. 58 In this regard, the Confucian
discourse may add to the general, comparative study of constitutional
identity.

Let us now turn to the comparative implications of Zhai's book on
Chinese constitutional identity. The cores of the Chinese constitutional
system discussed in the book are intimately connected to the socialist 1
constitutional principles. Particularly, these elements are defined by
the socialist principle of "democratic centralism," which enables
vertical and horizontal distribution of public power within a
centralized party-state. 69 The broader evolution of Chinese
constitutional identity is shaped by the dissonant interactions of
liberal, socialist, and Confucian constitutional aspirations. In addition,
the contextual Chinese constitutional knowledge presented in the book
constitutional identity. Comparative
complicates comparative
accounts of constitutional identity tend to focus on the liberal
constitutional states, which are limited to fundamental structures
defined by liberal aspirations. 60 A non-liberal state may also acquire a
constitutional identity driven by the dynamic interchanges of liberal
and non-liberal constitutional ideals.
B.

Concept Formation

Several comparatists created new analytical concepts to
understand China's constitution. To illustrate, consider two concepts,
and
"constitutional
entrepreneurs"
"constitutional
namely
dissonance."
Mark Jia creates the concept of constitutional entrepreneurship
to explain successful constitutional advocacy in China. 6 1 The concept
is empirically informed by two cases during the tenure of President Hu

57.
Confucian
58.
59.

Sungmoon Kim, From Remonstrance to Impeachment: A Curious Case of
Constitutionalism in South Korea, 44 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 586, 588 (2019).
See GARY J. JAcOBSOHN, CONSTITUTIONAL IDENTITY 339-42 (2010).
For more on this principle and its use in China, see N. W. BARBER, THE

PRINCIPLES OF CONSTITUTIONALISM 76-77 (2018).

60.
See generally JAcOBSOHN, supra note 58 (focusing on the United States,
India, Israel, and Ireland).
61.
See Mark Jia, China'sConstitutionalEntrepreneurs, 64 AM. J. COMP. L. 619,
629 (2016).
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Jintao (2002-2012), "a period of relative policy stability conducive to
comparative inquiry."6 2 The first case involves advocacy surrounding
the "Sun Zhigang incident," in which three legal scholars argued for
the unconstitutionality of the system of detention and, in turn,

influenced the abolition of this system. 63 The second case concerns
Peking University's Marxist Professor Gong Xiantian's use of
constitutional argumentation and popular pressure to influence the

enactment of a national property law. 64 Jia's study is based on both his
personal interviews with the constitutional advocates and on primary
65
written materials.

Jia's concept formation is based on the integration of several
existing theories on grassroot constitutional and policy dynamics, such
as popular constitutionalism, adaptive authoritarianism, and theories
of policy process. 66 Jia states that "[c]onstitutional entrepreneurship is
67
The theory
both an advocacy strategy and an explanatory theory."

includes a generalized set of positions that both explain Chinese
constitutional advocacy and guide ordinary Chinese citizens to use
68
constitutional argument to shape policy.
The theory of constitutional entrepreneurship sees constitutional
advocates as policy entrepreneurs. 69 Their work is entrepreneurial in
the sense that they construct new constitutional arguments like "a

fundamentally creative enterprise" 70 to influence policy. The lifecycle
of constitutional entrepreneurship is divided into four stages:
incubationor advocates' adoption of a coherent policy position and the
commitment to legal argument; disruption or the moment opening the
window for raising the profile of their policy; mobilization or advocate
of the broader populations; and recalibrationor the state's adjustment
under the pressure by incorporating the proposals mobilized by the
advocates.7 1 Jia's model features several strategies and conditions for
the success of constitutional advocacy. These include the use of
constitutional, rather than ideological or policy-specific, arguments to

achieve target policies; the collaboration with media organizations,
particularly the internet, to spread the message to the broader
population; and the "locat[ion] and exploit[ation] [of] internal divisions
72
inside the state."

62
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.

Id. at 623.
See id. at 633-35.
See id. at 631.
See id. at 623.
See id. at 624-29.
Id. at 629.
See id.
See id. at 627-28.
Id. at 630.
See id. at 630-33.
See id. at 631-32.
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Jia's concept of constitutional entrepreneurship is connected to
the comparative constitutional inquiry's recent turn to social
mobilization. In his recent book, Bruce Ackerman examines the role of
a mobilizing citizenry with "high-energy politics" in the constitutional
revolutions that took place in India, South Africa, France, and Italy. 73
Jia's concept

suggests

that the comparative

inquiry into social

mobilization for constitutional change is not necessarily accompanied
by the heightened engagement of the broader society. Constitutional
mobilization can occur at a micro-level with low-energy politics, which
involves the society's narrow sectors. This kind of micro-mobilization
does not result in constitutional revolutions but renders the
constitutions socially meaningful even under authoritarian settings.

Jia's concept can be further refined by considering the way in
which

constitutional

entrepreneurs

are

influenced

by

broader

structural opportunities. Why do constitutional advocates operate in
an entrepreneurial manner rather than turn to higher-energy politics

(e.g., social movements)? Among other factors (e.g., resources), the lack
of specific structural opportunities, such as the window of constitution
making or amendments, 74 limits the substantive scope and defines the
entrepreneurial manner of constitutional advocacy. In addition, the
general structural opportunity defined by the authoritarian control of
citizens' political activities prompts constitutional advocates to use
entrepreneurial tactics.

The related concept of "constitutional dissonance" is put forward
by Chang Wen-Chen and David Law. This concept denotes the idea
that the gap between the constitutional text and practice creates
"constructive irritant" or "the resulting state of deep tension and
contradiction furnishes the intellectual material and generates the
dialectic needed for transformation of the constitutional order."75
On that base, Chang and Law argue that China's Constitution
functions as an irritant in the sense that its gap (between text and
practice) generates the space for normative and meaningful
constitutional discourse and argumentation which the regime cannot
ignore. 76 Two stories in Jia's study illustrate these discursive

dynamics.

73.
BRUCE
ACKERMAN,
REvOLUTIONARY
LEADERSHIP AND THE RULE OF LAw 39 (2019).

CONSTITUTIONS:

CHARISMATIC

74.
Consider, for example, how Myanmar's military government's initiative of
constitutional amendments opened the window for a broader social movement. See
Simon Lewis, Suu Kyi's Bid to Reform Charter Sparks Rival Protests in Myanmar,
REUTERS
(July
17,
2019),
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-myanmarconstitution/suu-kyis-bid-to-reform-charter-sparks-rival-protests-in-myanmar-idUSKC
N1UC0KM [https://perma.cc/R78Q-89AC] (archived Sept. 27, 2020).
Chang & Law, supranote 2, at 509.
75.
76.
See id. at 511-13.
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Chang and Law's concept of constitutional dissonance echoes
Jacobsohn's concept of "constitutional disharmony." 77 Both concepts
suggest that gap between constitutional texts and practices are the
sources of constitutional dynamics. However, there are two important

differences.

First,

while

Jacobsohn

recognizes

two

aspects

of

constitutional disharmony (internal and external), he focuses more on
the former: the dissonant constitutional commitments within a
constitution. 78 Chang and Law are more concerned with the external
dimension: the gap between the constitution and its practice. Second,

while the three scholars recognize that constitutional disharmony or
dissonance is universal, Jacobsohn explores this phenomenon
specifically in the context of constitutionalist regimes while Chang and
Law focus on authoritarian regimes.

The concept of constitutional dissonance can be further explored.
In addition to the external gaps, the dissonance internal to the

constitution can also create the space for constitutional mobilization
and discourse. To illustrate, China's Constitution is replete with
ambiguities, such as the socialist rule of law, human rights, and civic
virtues, which provide a wide space for different interpretative
dynamics. The meanings of these constitutional provisions are not

merely determined by the party-state; rather, they can be also
influenced by social constitutional discourse and mobilization.
Discursive and mobilizing dynamics animated by internal and external
of
qualities
generate some constitutional
dissonances may
authoritarian regimes, such as legislative protection of constitutional
rights.

C. Causal Inference
Several comparative explanatory accounts of China's constitution
display aspects of the principles of case selection in inference-oriented
small-N (or micro) comparative studies, although not all of these
studies are principled in this line by research design.
Consider first China's constitutional divergence from the most

similar case: Vietnam. Both countries share the same socialist legal
system, socialist constitutional system under the leadership of a
communist party, and socialist market economy. Despite that,
comparative political studies have, for years, explored institutional
divergence (particularly, the representativeness and competitiveness
79
On
of elite political institutions) between the two countries.

JACOBSoHN, supra note 58, at 4.
77.
Id. at 87.
78.
See Edmund Malesky, Regina Abrami & Yu Zheng, Institutions and
79.
Inequality in Single-Party Regimes: A Comparative Analysis of Vietnam and China, 43
COMP. POL. 401, 402 (2011).
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comparative constitutional scholarship, Fu Hualing and Jason Buhi
have recently discussed the divergent constitutional trends; they argue
that "Vietnam is presently moving in a direction that offers more
prospects for convergence with international norms, as the current
Vietnamese party-state is relatively less politically monolithic, more
open to the influence of international laws and more tolerant of civil
society than its Chinese counterpart." 80 To illustrate, they demonstrate

that "whereas Vietnam appears to be liberalizing its perspective on
consultation, input and debate since 2013, China has opted to go in the
opposite direction, rendering the terms 'constitutionalism', 'civil
society' and 'judicial independence' (among others) taboo in academic
discourse." 81 This qualitative
observation complicates Law's
quantitative grouping of China and Vietnam together among the top of

statist constitutional preambles (first and third respectively). 82 Beyond
the convergent preambles, the real dynamics of constitutional rules,
institutions, and debates indicate the following: Vietnam's
constitutional trend tends to move toward the universalist direction to
gain international legitimacy while China's constitutional trend tends
to be more static due to the exceptionalist aspiration to develop an
alternative model to the Western liberal and universalist models. 83
Other studies explain China's unexpected constitutional
similarities to the countries to which it is most different, such as the
United States and the United Kingdom. Yan Lin and Ginsburg argue
that due to the lack of judicial constitutional review in China, the
Chinese Constitution is interpreted through the law-making process of
the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress in major
areas, such as distribution of governmental power, citizens' rights, and
the economic
structure. 84
China's legislative constitutional
interpretation shares a similar feature with the constitutional dialogue
between the legislature and courts in what Stephen Gardbaum called
the "New Commonwealth" (Canada, New Zealand, and the United

80.
Fu Hualing & Jason Buhi, Diverging Trends in the Socialist
Constitutionalism of the People's Republic of China and the Socialist Republic of
Vietnam, in SOCIALIST LAW IN SOCIALIST EAST ASIA 135, 140 (Hualing Fu, John
Gillespie, Pip Nicholson & William Partlett eds., 2018).
81.
Id. at 146 (referring to the debates on an independent institution
constitutional adjudication during Vietnam's 2013 constitution-making process).
82.
David S. Law, ConstitutionalArchetypes, 95 TEX. L. REV. 153, 212 (2016).
83.
To illustrate, Xi Jinping stressed the leadership of the Communist Party, a
feature of Chinese socialism, and said that: "'We must never follow the path of Western
'constitutionalism,' 'separation of powers,' or 'judicial independence."' Charlotte Gao, Xi:
China Must Never Adopt Constitutionalism, Separation of Powers, or Judicial
Independence, DIPLOMAT (Feb. 19, 2019), https://thediplomat.com/2019/02/xi-chinamust-never-adopt-constitutionalism-separation-of-powers-or-judicial-independence/
[https://perma.cc/9HDC-KC7V] (archived Sept. 20, 2020).
See Lin & Ginsburg, supra note 3, at 2.
84.
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Kingdom) model. 85 Constitutional interpretation by statutes in China

has also resonated with the American "age of the 'republic of statutes'
in which sub-constitutional legislation plays a central role in
86
In another study, Lin further
articulating fundamental norms."

explores

the

common

feature

of

legislative

constitutional

interpretation that China shares with other liberal constitutional

democracies. 87
China's constitution also is the most difficult case for the recent
theoretical prediction that authoritarianism in the twenty-first

century relies on legal and constitutional tools rather than personal
fiats. 88 The case of China may challenge this claim. Carl F. Minzner
argues that "[i]n the early twenty-first century, Chinese authorities
turned against law," citing party political control over the judiciary,
cracking down on public interest lawyers, and curtailing the influence
of foreign rule-of-law norms. 89 However, in a recent contribution, Taisu
Zhang and Ginsburg put forward an antithesis: "China's turn toward
law." 90 They argue that China has institutionalized the court system
and increasingly engaged with the Constitution, including the 2018
91
According to
amendments, to institutionalize political functions.
Zhang and Ginsburg, this legal and institutional trend is due to both
the regime's top-down commitment to bureaucratic legalization and
the citizens' bottom-up attachment of sociopolitical legitimacy to law
and legal institutions. 92 This argument is situated within the
comparative literature on the empowerment of courts and
93
constitutions in authoritarian regimes. Zhang and Ginsburg conclude
that "[t]he Chinese case adds much to our understanding of
authoritarian legality." 94 This conclusion, however, does not assume
that there is "a rise of 'constitutionalism' in Chinese politics" because
its authors believe that "[t]here is little evidence to suggest that the
Party leadership has internalized the normative authority of the

GARDBAUM,
STEPHEN
85.
CONSTITUTIONALISM 1 (2013).

THE

NEW

COMMONWEALTH

MODEL

OF

Lin & Ginsburg, supranote 3, at 21.
86.
Yan Lin, Constitutional Evolution Through Legislation: The Quiet
87.
Transformationof China's Constitution, 13 INT'L J. CONST. L. 61, 87-89 (2015).
See generally Kim Lane Scheppele, Autocratic Legalism, 85 U. CHI. L. REV.
88.
545 (2018); Ozan 0. Varol, Stealth Authoritarianism,100 IOWA L. REV. 1673 (2015).
Carl F. Minzner, China's Turn Against Law, 59 AM. J. COMP. L. 935, 936-37
89.
(2011). See generally CARL F. MINZNER, END OF AN ERA: HoW CHINA'S AUTHORITARIAN
REvIVAL IS UNDERMINING ITS RISE (2018).

90.
See generally Taisu Zhang & Tom Ginsburg, China's Turn Toward Law, 59
VA. J. INT'L L. 278 (2019).
Id. at 282.
91.
Id. at 284-85.
92.
Id. at 287 (citing CONSTITUTIONS IN AUTHORITARIAN REGIMES (Tom
93.
Ginsburg & Alberto Simpser eds., 2014); ROBERT BARROS, CONSTITUTIONALISM AND

DIcTATORSHIP (2000); Mark Tushnet, supra note 41, at 391).
94.
Id.
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Constitution in any fashion." 95 Thomas E. Kellogg holds the same

skeptical view, arguing that China's Constitution functions as a "false
blueprint" to legitimize the party's rule "by maintaining the political
fiction that China is transitioning to constitutional governance." 96
China's engagement with the Constitution, however, validates the
claim on the legality of authoritarianism in the twenty-first century.

Different from the above skeptical views, other comparative
accounts contextualize China as a prototypical case of authoritarian
constitutionalism. Consider first the general features of authoritarian
constitutionalism. Using Singapore as an original case, Tushnet
generalizes authoritarian constitutionalism as a regime that "is
controlled by a dominant party"; "does not arrest political opponents
arbitrarily"; "allows reasonably open discussion and criticism of its
policies"; "operates reasonably free and fair election"; "is sensitive to
public opinion and alters its policies at least on occasion in response to
what it perceives to be public views"; "may develop mechanisms to
ensure that the amount of dissent does not exceed the level it regards
as desirable"; and renders courts "reasonably independent and enforce
basic rule-of-law requirements reasonably well." 9 7 Chang and Law
contend that categories of authoritarian constitutionalism "are capable
of encompassing China." 98 In a contribution to a comparative study on
authoritarian constitutionalism, Michael W. Dowdle explores the
"routinized" practices (e.g., legislative hearings, the bureaucratic
process of legislative drafting, administrative legislation, judicial
as
the
interest
litigations)
and
public
professionalism,
"infrastructural" source of constitutional evolution of the Chinese
state.9 9 These practices are closer to the rule of law than
constitutionalism; rather than impose institutional limitations on the
decision makers, they are a means for the decision makers to ensure
the legality of the work of government officials and judges.
Constitutionalism and authoritarianism are not clearly bifurcated

institutional configurations. Partial authoritarian practices may
emerge within a stable constitutionalist polity;' 00 conversely, partial
constitutionalist practices may emerge within a stable authoritarian
polity. Authoritarian constitutionalism as a stable hybrid regime and

Id. at 319.
95.
Thomas E. Kellogg, Arguing Chinese Constitutionalism: The 2013
96.
ConstitutionalDebateand the "Urgency"ofPoliticalReform, 11 U. PA. ASIAN L. REV. 337,
351 (2017).
Tushnet, Authoritarian Constitutionalism,supra note 41, at 449-50.
97.
Chang & Law, supranote 2, at 18.
98.
Michael W. Dowdle, Infrastructural Power and its Possibilities for the
99.
Constitutional Evolution of AuthoritarianPolitical Systems: Lessons from China, in
AUTHORITARIAN CONSTITUTIONALISM: COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS AND CRITIQUE 76, 82-83

(Helena Alviar Garcia & Gunter Frankenberg eds., 2019).
100. See generally CAN IT HAPPEN HERE?: AUTHORITARIANISM IN AMERICA (Cass
R. Sunstein ed., 2018).
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partial constitutionalist practices under authoritarianism are
conceptually distinct. An authoritarian regime defined as "a regimelevel commitment to a set of practices that help unfetter rule through
that hold ultimate decisionmakers
institutions
undermining

accountable"101

may

partially

embrace

some

constitutionalist

practices, but it is not equated to authoritarian constitutionalism. In

this regard, China may embrace partial constitutionalist practices that
place institutional limitations on the ultimate decision makers, but
this does not necessarily amount to authoritarian constitutionalism.

Cuban-American legal scholar Larry Cata Backer even moves
further to create a theory of Chinese party-state constitutionalism as
0 2
He rejects the Western
an outlier of comparative constitutionalism.1
"Chinese
arguing that
China's constitution,
to
approaches
constitutionalism cannot be approached as a variant of a Western
project grounded in the fundamental premise that the constitution of
a state represents the culmination of a process of managing all of the

political authority." 10 3 He then proposes the theory of Chinese partystate constitutionalism, which is defined by the two interrelated but
distinct spheres of authority-namely, political authority and

administrative obligation-and the concomitant coexistence of two
constitutions.1 04 The political authority is vested in the leading
communist party and constrained by the party's constitution (the
political constitution), while the state constitution expresses the
political constitution's values and objectives, regulates government
105
administration, and limits individuals' arbitrary use of power.
Backer's theory is both normative and explanatory. As an
explanatory model, it has implications for inference-oriented
comparative inquiries into China's constitution. It explains why
China's Constitution has changed to institutionalize the directions put
forward by the party's constitution. For example, the 2018
constitutional amendment's incorporation of Xi Jinping Thought
follows the same move in the 2017 amendments to the party's
constitution.1 06 The party's constitution is, therefore, not separate from

101.
(2020).
102.

Mark Jia, Illiberal Law in American Courts, 168 U. PA. L. REV. 1685, 1692
For his earlier accounts, see generally Larry Catd Backer, Party, People,

Government and State: On Constitutional Values and the Legitimacy of the Chinese

State-Party Rule of Law System, 30 B.U. INT'L L.J. 331 (2012).
103. Larry CatA Backer, Chinese Constitutionalism in the "New Era": The
Constitution in Emerging Idea and Practice, 33 CONN. J. INT'L L. 163, 179 (2018)
(emphasis omitted).
104. See id.
105. Id.
106. Resolution of the 19th Nat'l Cong. of the Communist Party of China on the
Revised Constitution of the Communist Party of China (promulgated by the Standing
Comm. Nat'l People's Cong., Oct.
24, 2017, effective Oct. 24, 2017),
[https://perma.cc/75
http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2017-10/24/c_136702726.htm
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parties'

constitutional function is not unique to China but is common in living
constitutional orders in multiparty systems. 10 7 However, in contrast to

the political parties in multiparty democracies, the Communist Party
in China is not an electoral party: it is not an institution of the civil
society created to compete for power through competitive elections.
Rather, it is constitutionally mandated by a living and recently textual
norm as the leading force of the socialist regime, making it a
constitutional institution inseparable from the state.
D. Large-N Studies
China's constitution has often been referred to as an illustrating
case in large-N comparative constitutional studies. In an earlier macrostudy on the right to resist in the world's constitutions, scholars
discussed this right within the context of Chinese political-legal
tradition.1 08 They demonstrate that the idea of a right to resist is
associated with Mencius, a Chinese Confucian philosopher, who
believed that when the rulers lost the Mandate of Heaven, as "reflected
in the rise of natural disasters, wars, or economic difficulties," the
people's resistance to commands of the rulers became justified. 109 They
conclude that "[t]he Chinese tradition thus included the seeds of a right
to resist, though the idea did not fully blossom as it did in the era of
the French and American revolutions." 10 Hence, Chinese legalpolitical concepts are historically contextualized in the macrocomparative study of a constitutional right.
In a recent macro-study of the world's constitutional preambles,
Law uses the Chinese constitutional preamble to epitomize the statist
constitutional archetype and compares it with Australia's liberal
preamble.111 He demonstrates that China's constitutional preamble

R9-PN2G] (archived Sept. 20, 2020). Xi Jinping emphasizes socialism with Chinese
characteristics, including the leadership of the Communist Party of China, governing the
country with the rule of law, and comprehensive reforms, among others. For law reform
in China under Xi Jinping, see generally CHINA'S SOcIALIST RULE OF LAw REFORMS
UNDER XI JINPING, supra note 10.
107. See, e.g., Daryl J. Levinson & Richard H. Pildes, Separationof Parties, Not
Powers, 119 HARv. L. REV. 2312, 2349-68 (2006) (evaluating the American Constitution's
separation of powers through the lens of political parties); Ingrid van
Biezen, ConstitutionalizingParty Democracy: The Constitutive Codification of Political
Partiesin Post-war Europe, 42 BRIT. J. POL. SCi. 187, 189 (2012) (analyzing how parties
have been constitutionalized throughout Europe to make them integral to the modern
state's governance).
108. See generally Tom Ginsburg, Daniel Lansberg-Rodriguez & Mila Versteeg,
When to Overthrow Your Government: The Right to Resist in the World's Constitutions,
60 UCLA L. REV. 1184 (2013).
109. Id. at 1196-97.
110. Id. at 1198.
111. Law, supra note 82, at 185.
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"offers nothing less than a social, political, and economic history of the
Chinese people, much of which amounts to their glorious struggle
under the tutelage of great leaders against a parade of maladies and
injustices," and that "the Chinese preamble also takes care to equate
11 2
the Chinese people with the Chinese state.
The Chinese case has been recurrently discussed in the recent

large-N study ("2020 Study"), in which Versteeg and her collaborators
explore a range of constitutional strategies of presidential term-limit
evasion used by 234 incumbents in 106 countries since the year 2000.
Particularly, they indicate that constitutional amendment is the most

common strategy, as it comprised 60 percent of all evasion attempts
and 40 percent of successful cases. They identify two ingredients-

president's power and the ease of amendments-as essential for the
successful use of amendments to evade term limits, and the Chinese
13
This Article will
case is repeatedly used to illustrate the success.1

focus on the 2020 Study to consider the possibility and the limits in the
way China's constitution is integrated into large-N comparative
14
constitutional inquiry.1
Term limits were first established in China's Constitution in 1982
and are attributed to Deng Xiaoping's intention to break through oneman rule after the Mao years.11 5 Article 79 of the original Constitution
provides that "[t]he term of office of the President and Vice-President
of the People's Republic of China is the same as that of the National
People's Congress, and they shall serve no more than two consecutive
terms."11 6 In March 2018, China's National People's Congress adopted
a package of constitutional amendments, which included, among other
things, the deletion of the second sentence in that provision, effectively
7
abolishing term limits to the President and the Vice President.11 This
move has generated much controversial debate both inside and outside
China; supporters believe that term-limit deletion is consistent with
Xi's anti-corruption
to continue
needs-particularly
China's
campaign'1 8 -while critics considered this "a drawback and a means
9
Term-limit deletion
for President Xi to stay in power forever."11
through formal constitutional amendment in China is consistent with
the prevailing claim that formal constitutional amendment is the most

Id.
See Versteeg, Horley, Meng, Guim & Guirguis, supranote 3, at 187.
The below discussions of presidential term-limit evasion in China are drawn
from my book, BUI NGOc SON, CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE IN THE CONTEMPORARY
SOCIALIST WORLD 310-12 (2020).
115. Feng Lin, supra note 14, at 14.
116. XIANFA art. 79 (1982) (China).
117. XIANFA art. 79 (2018) (China).
118. Feng Lin, supra note 14, at 14.
119. Id. at 11 (noting domestic scholars criticized the amendments through
WeChat groups since they cannot express such criticisms through official media).
112.
113.
114.
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common way of term-limit evasion in the world. This explains why the

China case is used as an illustrating case in the 2020 Study.
The 2020 Study demonstrates that the removal of term limits in

China's 2018 constitutional amendment was smooth and successful,
"with essentially no opposition at all," due to Xi's mass popularity and
support.1 20 That claim is debatable. Considering unusual secrecy and
urgency regarding the Communist Party of China's meetings
surrounding the amendment process, Zhang and Ginsburg believe that
"there is no evidence to suggest that the removal of constitutional term
limits was, in fact, painless or easy. Instead, there is reason to suspect
that Xi had actually encountered opposition that was only overcome
with some difficulty."121 Related to the president's power, the 2020
Study also holds that the success of term-limit evasion is due to the
fact that the president had sufficient control over the legislature.1 2 2
Perhaps, that the Chinese legislature overwhelmingly approved the
amendments with only 2 dissenters12 3 generates the impression that
the president had sufficient control over this body, and hence the
amendments were achieved easily and smoothly. But the final
approval at the legislative platform is just the facial manifestation of
political elite's internal agreement. In addition, the legislature in
China is under the institutional control of the party as a collective
entity rather than a single party leader.1 24
Next, consider the second element of evasion success-the ease of
the amendment. The formal rule requires a two-thirds legislative
majority for the amendment's approval.1 25 This requirement is
relatively low compared with other experiences-for example, fourfifths legislative majority or three-fourths legislative majority plus
popular referendum. 26 In addition, the two-thirds requirement is
easily achievable in China as there is no opposition party in the
communist party-controlled legislature. In addition to the procedural
features, China has not codified unamendability and hence any
changes to the Constitution are constitutionally possible, including
term-limit deletion. It seems that China's case is consistent with the
theory that amendment's ease is the element (or reason) of evasion
success.

120. Versteeg, Horley, Meng, Guim & Guirguis, supra note 3, at 200, 208.
121. Zhang & Ginsburg, supra note 90, at 327.
122. Versteeg, Horley, Meng, Guim & Guirguis, supra note 3, at 207.
123. Nectar Gan, Xi Jinping Cleared to Stay on as China'sPresident With Just 2
Dissenters Among 2,964 Votes, S. CHINA MORNING POST (Mar. 11, 2018, 4:00 PM),
https://www.scmp.com/news/china/policies-politics/article/2136719/xi-jinping-cleared-st
ay-president-chinas-political [https://perma.cc/L59A-NEAT] (archived Sept. 27, 2020).
124. See He, supra note 6, at 75-82.
125. XIANFA art. 64 (1982) (China).
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20211

CHINA'S COMPARA TIVE CONSTITUTION

23

However, the amendment practice in China is not merely
determined by the formal rule but must be situated within the broader
political dynamics. This requires systematic considerations of
amendment culture and temporal variability in difficulty to amend the
127
Chinese
constitution driven by the particularities of the moment.
amendment culture is characterized by the political perception of the
Constitution's stability as a desirable condition for the nation's
stability and the cautious attitude toward amendments as associated
with radical political changes informed by the experience in Eastern
Europe.1 28 That culture makes amendments difficult to pass despite
the ease of formal rules. In fact, since its enactment in 1984, China's
Constitution was amended only five times in four decades: 1988, 1993,
1999, 2004 and 2018. In addition, temporal variability in amendment
difficulty is considerable; there are four amendments in fourteen years

(from 1988 to 2004), but there is only one amendment in sixteen years
(from 2004 to 2018). These amendments are shaped by the
particularities of the moment. The 1988 and 1993 amendments were

shaped by the context of the domestic reformist era when China opened
the country in the early stage, while the 1999 and 2004 amendments
were associated with the particularities of the globalizing era when the
29
The 2018
country joined the global market, including the WTO.1
amendment of the exceptional moment occurred when China was
rising as the global power and had become confident to move its own
way in the course of development, which differed from the Western

models of development. The 2018 amendments are a part of Chinese
Particularly, term-limit deletion
constitutional exceptionalism.
expresses the exceptional attitude that China does not follow the
30
Western constitutional model of limited government.1
While the 2020 Study identifies interesting global constitutional
trends regarding term-limit evasion, it treats the Chinese case, to
borrow Hirschl's words, "much like a doctor in a triage system treats
patients: with empathy and urgency, but ultimately in a distant,
composed fashion."1 3 1 The consequence is that this macro study
overlooks micro contextual dynamics surrounding China's term-limit
evasion through constitutional amendments.

127. ALBERT, supra note 40, at 110-11, 126.
128. See Yan Lin, supra note 87, at 81-82.
129. On these amendments, see Zhenmin Wang & Yuan Tao, Achieving
Development Through Innovative Constitutionalism:A China Story, WORLD BANK LEGAL
REV. 201, 202 (2013).
130. For Chinese constitutional exceptionalism, see BUI, supra note 114, at 277.
131. HIRSCHL, supra note 1, at 272.
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III. EXPLAINING COMPARATIVE ENGAGEMENTS

This Part seeks to explain why the field of comparative
constitutional law has had greater engagements with China's
constitution than previous periods. These comparative engagements,

which are conditioned by the dynamics of both China's constitution and
of comparative constitutional law, are mainly animated by the
curiosity and quest to understand China's constitutional dynamics,
and, to some extent, China's practical need to develop its constitutional
system and particular views about constitutional justice.

A.

Conditions

1. The Dynamics of China's Constitution

The comparative constitutional law scholarship's engagements
with China are conditioned by the increasing dynamics of China's
constitution. The marginalization of China in comparative
constitutional law is largely due to the relegation of China's
Constitution as a sham text.1 32 However, in recent years, China's
Constitution has been increasingly relevant to the real politics and the
society. Zhang and Ginsburg demonstrate that China's Constitution
"already carries much more political weight than scholars have
previously given it credit for, indeed at the highest levels of the partystate, and that recent developments have only further bolstered its
influence and significance."1 33 The recent developments include the Xi
Jinping-era political discourse, which enhanced the Constitution's
sociopolitical salience, and the 2018 constitutional amendments, which
displayed the attachment to the Constitution as the source of
sociological legitimacy.1 34 Zhang and Ginsburg paid greater attention

to China's Constitution as they realized the greater political
significance of the document.
China's Constitution is not only politically but also socially
relevant. The 2013 constitutionalism debate and earlier constitutional
advocacy indicate that China's Constitution is increasingly socially
relevant to public discourse and mobilization. The same constitutional
text has different significances to the party-state and the society.
Political leaders may attach to political discourse and functions to the
constitution to consolidate the legal foundation of the legitimacy of the
party-state. But public intellectual discourse and social mobilization

132. See David
S. Law
& Mila
Versteeg,
Sham
Constitutions,
101 CALIF. L. REV. 863, 905 (2013) (listing China among top ten countries in the world
with constitutional underperformance scores in the areas of civil and political freedoms).
133. Zhang & Ginsburg, supra note 90, at 318-19.
134. See id. at 351, 357.
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seek to realize the Constitution's normative commitments, such as
human rights and the rule of law. The public discourse and
mobilization render the Constitution socially significant. The
Constitution's social and political significance makes it a discursive
site for comparative constitutional engagement.
Timing is relevant. The 2013 constitutionalism debate and the
2018 amendments provide particularly important sources for
comparative constitutional engagements with China in the last five
years. By 2013, the constitutionalism debate did not merely occur
within the Chinese intellectual community but reached the broader
community via social media, which drew comparative attention. In
addition, the 2018 amendments attracted comparative inquiry

partially because they were domestically extensive and partially
because they echoed international constitutional phenomena in recent
years (e.g., the rise of constitutional authoritarianism generally and
term-limit evasion particularly).
Apart from the increasing importance of the constitutional text,
the dynamics of the Chinese living constitution generate the condition
for comparative engagement. The dynamics include the increasing
institutionalization of the state and the party. The new bureaucracy
emerging in China since the beginning of the reforms in 1978
corresponded to "the massive shift from a centrally planned economy.
135
The administrative
to a more open and marketized one."
massive, and
in China today "is centralized,
government
extraordinarily complex."13 6 The country's National People's Congress,
a unicameral legislature elected every five years, is composed by a
standing committee and special committees and included 2,980
members in 2018, making it the largest parliamentary body in the
world.1 37 The court system has been highly institutionalized,
consisting of thousands of district-level basic people's courts (the lowest
level courts), staffed by 146,000 judges; hundreds of prefecture-level
intermediate people's courts, staffed by 36,000 judges; thirty-one
provincial-level high people's courts, staffed by 7,000 judges; and the
Supreme People's Court at the central level, staffed by more than 500
judges, in addition to specialist courts.1 38 These institutional dynamics
generate sources for comparative constitutional engagement with

China.

135.

FRANCIS FUKUYAMA, POLITICAL ORDER AND POLITICAL DECAY 371 (2014).

136. Id. at 374.
137. See China Quanguo Renmin Daibiao Dahui (National People's Congress),
PARLINE (2018), http://archive.ipu.org/parline-e/reports/2065_A.htm (last updated
Mar. 19, 2018) [https://perma.cc/UD9V-RX86] (archived Sept. 20, 2020) (describing the
National People's Congress and presenting statistics related to it).
138. Weixia Gu, Courts. in China: Judiciary in The Economic and Societal
Transitions, in ASIAN COURTS IN CONTEXT 489-93 (Jiunn-rong Yeh & Wen-Chen Chang

eds., 2014).
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As Backer and He Xin indicate,1 39 the Communist Party of China
is an internal part of the Chinese living constitutional order. Like the
state, the Communist Party in China has been highly institutionalized.
The party has its own Constitution based on the Leninist principle of

"democratic centralism," which allows for the combination of a
collective leadership and "division of labor" among the party
members. 4 0 To maintain its ruling capacity and its legitimacy, the
party has complex institutional structures at the central level (the
National Congress, Political Bureau, Central Committee, Standing
Committee, and other specific committees) and a web of local party
cells.'14 Some doubted that under Xi's era the party retuned to
personalistic rule.1 42 Other studies, however, have demonstrated the
party's institutionalization under Xi-era, including establishment of a

National Security Commission, the reorganization of the party
leadership of the People's Liberation Army, the reorganization of the
various civilian maritime security agencies, and the establishment of

the Cybersecurity and Informatization Leading Small Group.1 43 The
party's institutional dynamics create the conditions for comparative

political-constitutional studies, as indicated the work by Backer, Zhang
and Ginsburg.
2. The Dynamics of Comparative Constitutional Law
Comparative constitutional law's jurisdictional, substantive, and
epistemological expansion creates the condition for the field's greater
engagements with China's constitution. First, in the last few years,
comparative constitutional law has incrementally expanded its
jurisdictional scope beyond the Western or similar institutional
settings.1 44 For example, the International Society of Public Law was
held in Asia (Hong Kong) for the first time in 2018, and

139.
140.

See generally He, supra note 6.
Id. at 76-77.

141. See JINGHAN ZENG, THE CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY'S CAPACITY TO RULE:
IDEOLOGY, LEGITIMACY AND PARTY COHESION 153 (2015); Yongnian Zheng, The

Institutionalization of the Communist Party and the Party System in China, in PARTY
SYSTEM

INSTITUTIONALIZATION

IN

ASIA:

DEMOCRACIES,

AUTOCRACIES,

'AND THE

SHADOWS OF THE PAST 162 (Allen Hicken & Erik Martinez Kuhonta eds., 2014).
142. But see, e.g., Susan L. Shirk, China in Xi's "New Era": The Return to
Personalistic Rule, 29 J. DEMOCRACY 22, 23 (2018).
143. E.g., Jean-Pierre Cabestan, China's Institutional Changes in the Foreign and
Security Policy Realm Under Xi Jinping: Power Concentration vs. Fragmentation
Without Institutionalization, 34 E. ASIA 1, 5-15 (2017).
144. For recent efforts, see generally CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND
TRANSFORMATION IN LATIN AMERICA (Richard Albert, Carlos Bernal & Juliano Zaiden

Benvindo eds., 2019); Maartje De Visser & Bui Ngoc Son, Contemporary Constitution
Making in Asia-Pacific, 7 CHINESE J. COMPAR. L. 241 (2019); JAMES FOWKES, BUILDING
THE CONSTITUTION: THE PRACTICE OF CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION IN POSTAPARTHEID SOUTH AFRICA (2016).
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correspondingly the International Journal of Constitutional Law
published an issue focusing on Asia. 145 The jurisdictional expansion
prompts comparative constitutionalists to reach out to unfamiliar
institutional settings, including China.

The second aspect of comparative constitutional law's dynamics
concerns the substantive issues of inquiry. The fact that China lacks
judicial review disfavors it as a site for comparative constitutional
studies, which have been dominated by the questions on courts and
their constitutional adjudication.1 4 6 However, in recent years,
comparative constitutional inquiry has expanded its substantive scope,
discussing a range of nonjudicial issues, including constitution making,
constitutional amendments, and political or legislative aspects of
constitutionalism.14 7 China's recent constitutional experience echoes
these comparative issues. Consequently, the field's exploration for
nonjudicial issues renders countries without judicial review, like

China, attractive sites for comparative inquiry.
The third dimension of the expansion of comparative
constitutional law concerns the epistemological underpinnings of
constitutional systems. China has been less attractive to comparative
constitutional inquiry, in part, because its Constitution is rooted in
Leninist-Marxist ideas, while the field has focused on constitutional
protection of liberal rights by liberal institutions (such as courts,
separation of powers, and other forms of checks and balances), which

are intellectually connected to Enlightenment liberalism. However,
recent years have witnessed the comparative exposition to various
ideational foundations (liberal, neoliberal, and non-liberal) of
constitutional systems.1 48 Particularly, Tushnet's suggestion of
pluralizing the concept of constitutionalism exemplifies the pluralist
thinking about constitutional issues in non-liberal terms. Such
epistemological expansion enables the field to engage with
constitutional systems underpinned by communitarian and socialist

ideas, such as those of Singapore and China respectively.
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See generally Editorial,16 INT'L J. CONST. L 311 (2018).
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B. Factors:Knowledge, Necessities, and PoliticalViews
The comparative constitutional law scholarship's engagements
with China are mainly driven by the intellectual curiosity and quest to
discover the unknown regarding the dynamics of China's constitution.

Why has China's Constitution become more politically important? Is
Chinese constitutionalism an oxymoron? How does China implement
the Constitution without judicial review? How does China's
constitution evolve overtime without frequent formal amendments?
Why is the
constitution?

party

constitution

important

for

Chinese

living

Most comparative studies of China's constitution involve casual
inference-the mode of comparative inquiry that seeks to provide
answers for a range of the above curious Chinese constitutional
questions. To illustrate, Zhang and Ginsburg sought to provide "the
first comprehensive survey of judicial and constitutional developments
in the Xi Jinping era" due to the intellectual drive to understand the
"underappreciated features of the party-state" and "how its current
structural layout demands higher levels of legality in both the party
and the state."1 4 9 Even the studies that create new concepts, such as
Jia's constitutional entrepreneurs and Chang and Law's constitutional
dissonance, also primarily seek to understand the driving forces (social
advocacy and political discourse) of Chinese constitutional dynamics.
Macro-studies generally aim to create constitutional knowledge and
their engagement with China is also mainly driven by intellectual
curiosity: for example, what contributes to China's success with
presidential term-limits evasion through constitutional amendments?

Although the discovery of the unexplored constitutional
knowledge is the main drive, comparative engagements implicitly or
explicitly respond to the practical need for Chinese constitutional
development. For example, Jia's concept of constitutional
entrepreneurship seeks to both explain and guide Chinese
constitutional advocacy. 150 Chang and Law also write that "[t]he
marginalization of China as an object of study has deleterious effects
not only for the field of comparative constitutional law, but also
potentially for the development of constitutionalism in China itself."151
In this line, their concept of constitutional dissonance not only explains
but also facilitates Chinese constitutional development. The normative
implication of this concept tends to be that the dynamics of
constitutional discourse are a constructive condition for China's
constitutional development. In the same vein, Backer's model both

149.
150.
151.

Zhang & Ginsburg, supra note 90, at 286-87.
Jia, supranote 61, at 674.
Chang & Law, supra note 2, at 3.

explains
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and

advances

the

Chinese

model

of

party-state

52

constitutionalism.1
In addition to knowledge and necessities,

some comparative

studies of China's constitution are driven by particular political
outlooks. To illustrate, Kellogg's critical view of China's Constitution
as a "false blueprint" is animated by a liberal view about constitutional
justice that is associated with limited government. 5 3 In contrast,
Backer's positive view of the Chinese model of party-state
constitutionalism is informed by a socialist outlook on constitutional

justice.1 54
IV. CONCLUSION

This study has explained the modes, conditions, and factors of
comparative constitutional engagements with China. The comparative
engagements with China's constitution, however, should not be
overstated. A range of Chinese constitutional questions have not yet
been substantively explored and explained within a comparative
constitutional framework. Questions for future comparative inquiry
into China's constitution include constituent power, participatory
constitution making, transnational engagement and resistance in
constitution making, the political construction of unconstitutional
international
Constitution's
the
amendments,
constitutional
others.
dimensions, and legislated constitutional rights, among

152.
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154.

See Backer, supra note 103, at 179.
See Kellogg, supra note 96, at 351.
See Backer, supra note 103, at 205-11.

***

